We present a modal logic for reasoning about what groups of agents can bring about by collective action. Given a set of states, we introduce game frames which associate with every state a strategic game among the agents. Game frames are essentially extensive games of perfect information with simultaneous actions, where every action profile is associated with a new state, the outcome of the game. A coalition of players is effective for a set of states in a game if the coalition can guarantee the outcome of the game to lie in . We propose a modal logic (Coalition Logic) to formalize reasoning about effectivity in game frames, where ³ expresses that coalition is effective for ³.
Introduction
Modelling actions and their effects is a task which has occupied many researchers in computer science, logic, economics and philosophy. In the simplest case, we have one agent (person, process) who can choose between taking different actions which change the state of the world in various ways. A simple model of this scenario will contain an accessibility relation Ê which associates to every state of the world all those states which the agent can bring about through his actions, i.e. ×ÊØ holds if in state × the agent can act so as to bring about state Ø.
In modal logic, one introduces a language to talk about such Kripke models: ¿³ expresses that the agent can act in such a way that ³ will be true after his action.
This simple one-agent case can easily be extended to many agents by considering a relational structure which contains an accessibility relation Ê for every agent , where ¿ ³ expresses that agent can bring about ³. The problem with such a multi-agent action logic is that it considers the different agents in isolation. Given a state × ¼ , agent 1 may act to bring about state × ½ and agent 2 may act to bring about state × ¾ , but what happens if both of them act simultaneously in × ¼ ? Since the actions of the two agents will often not be independent but interact with each other, a more general model of action should associate a resulting state with every pair of actions´ ½ ¾ µ of the two players rather than with actions of the players individually.
In this paper, we develop a modal logic based on such more general action models which we shall call game frames. At any state of such a frame, each agent ¾ AE takes an action, and taken together these actions determine the resulting state. This amounts to associating a strategic game form with every state of the frame where the outcomes of the game are states of the frame again. Thus, game frames are essentially extensive game forms with simultaneous actions (see [9] ). In Section 2, game frames are introduced together with extensive games without simultaneous moves as well as non-deterministic processes as special cases. Section 3 relates a notion of effectivity to strategic games, formalizing what it means for a coalition of agents to have the ability to force a certain set of outcomes in a strategic game. This notion of effectivity will then be used as the basic semantic notion for the modal logic we develop in Section 4. For a set of agents AE, the modal language will contain formulas ³ which express that the group of agents can bring about ³, i.e. is effective for ³. We provide a complete axiomatization of this logic in Section 5, together with some coalitional principles which serve to restrict the power of coalitions enough to yield an axiomatization of extensive games without simultaneous moves. Section 6 discusses the complexity of the satisfiability problem for coalition logic. The possibility for agents to combine strategies when forming a coalition is responsible for making this problem PSPACE-complete rather than NP-complete. Finally, Section 7 provides a unifying game-theoretic view of modal logic where normal as well as non-normal modal logics emerge as restricted versions of Coalition Logic.
The logic introduced here can be viewed as a generalization of the modal base logic underlying Parikh's game logic Ä [10, 11] , an extension of Propositional Dynamic Logic. Ä is a logic of determined 2-player games, though a multi-player version is also discussed. The generalization of Coalition Logic consists of dropping the assumption of determinacy and extending the language from individual players to groups of players. While operations on games are not the concern of this paper, such operations could also be added to Coalition Logic, see the remarks in Section 8.
A model of interaction: game frames
As mentioned in the introduction, we would like an action model where at each state, the actions taken by the agents together determine the resulting state. To obtain such a model, we associate a strategic game with every state of the world. A strategic game Ǽ ¦ ¾ AE Ó Ë µ consists of a non-empty finite set of agents or players AE, a non-empty set of strategies or actions ¦ for every player ¾ AE, a non-empty set of outcome states Ë and an outcome function Ó ¥ ¾AE ¦ Ë which associates with every tuple of strategies of the players (strategy profile) an outcome state in Ë.
In game theory [9, 2] , strategic games also come equipped with a preference relation Ë ¢ Ë for every player ¾ AE which indicates which outcomes a player prefers. Strictly speaking, our strategic games are only game forms which can be turned into a game by adding these preference relations. For notational convenience, let ´ µ ¾ denote the strategy tuple for coalition AE which consists of player choosing strategy ¾ ¦ . Then given two strategy tuples and (where AE Ò ), Ó´ µ denotes the outcome state associated with the strategy profile induced by and . Let AE Ë be the set of all strategic games among the set of players AE over the set of states Ë. Then we define a game frame for players AE as a pair´Ë µ where Ë is a non-empty set of states and Ë AE Ë is a function which associates strategic games to states. In game theoretic terminology, game frames are essentially extensive game forms with simultaneous moves [9] , the only difference being that we assume that at every state some game can be played, i.e. there are no terminal positions in the game. This assumption that is a total function is a matter of convenience, since it allows for a smoother comparison with traditional modal logics (Section 7). Furthermore, nothing is lost making this assumption, since terminal positions can always be equipped with a dummy game and a special label indicating that it is terminal. In any case, results about axiomatization and complexity can be generalized to the case where is partial.
Game frames are models of interaction which generalize other well-known action models. First, one may require that agents do not act in parallel but only consecutively. This is captured by extensive game forms without simultaneous moves, and can be modelled e.g. by a standard Kripke models with one accessibility relation which links states to successor states and propositional letters being used to indicate which player has to move. These extensive games without simultaneous moves can also be characterized within the class of game frames. Call a strategic game
Note that in case there is more than one dictator, the outcome function is constant (i.e.
× Ó´ µ ×) and hence every player is a dictator. A dictatorial frame is a game framé Ë µ such that for every × ¾ Ë there is some ¾ AE such that ´×µ is a -dictatorship. It should be clear that dictatorial frames correspond to the Kripke models just mentioned: the dictator is the one who can choose between the different successor states.
Non-deterministic processes are an even more restricted class of game frames: there is only one player, and consequently this player can decide at every state what the successor state should be. In this case, no interaction arises and we can do with a standard Kripke frame to model such processes. In terms of game frames, a process is a game frame´Ë µ for a set of players AE where AE ½ . It is easy to see that every process is also a dictatorial frame, where the same dictator is in power at every state.
Strategic games and effectiveness
In the next section, we propose a logic for describing and reasoning about the interaction model described in the previous section. The property we want to reason about is coalitional effectiveness: assuming a particular state ×, is a coalition of players AE effective in achieving a set of states Ë? The notion of effectivity to be employed comes from social choice theory where it goes under the name of «-effectivity [7, 1] .
Given a game , a coalition AE will be effective for a set Ë iff the coalition has a joint strategy which will result in an outcome in no matter what strategies the other players choose. Formally, the effectivity function È´AEµ ÈÈ´Ëµµ of a game is defined as
As the quantifier combination suggests, effectivity in strategic games has both existential and universal character. This is mirrored in our informal translation of ¾ ´ µ as 'coalition can force '.
Besides looking at effectiveness in strategic games, the notion of effectiveness can also Effectivity functions have been investigated in [8, 1, 12] and find application in the theory of social choice [7] where the agents are voters who try to force certain election outcomes. While we consider any function È´AEµ ÈÈ´Ëµµ to be an effectivity function, most of the literature has taken a more restrictive view, requiring to satisfy various basic properties, some of which (e.g. monotonicity) have been mentioned. The choice of these basic properties, however, is somewhat arbitrary, and this opinion is supported by the fact that authors differ in which basic properties they require. Here, we decided to be as general as possible regarding the notion of an effectivity function, codifying all the properties we are interested in in the notion of playability to be introduced in the next section.
Characterizing effectivity in strategic games
The question to be examined here is which effectivity functions are effectivity functions of some strategic game. As we will see in the next section, this characterization result will be very useful when formulating the semantics of coalition logic, since it allows us to dispense with strategic games by only talking about effectivity functions. Two such characterization results have been obtained in [7, 12] . However, these assume that the outcome function Ó of a strategic game is surjective, whereas we do not want to assume that every state can be reached provided that the players pick the right strategies; certain states may be unreachable no matter how the players play. For the same reason, we did not assume that playable effectivity functions satisfy ¾ ´AE µ for all ; usually, this is considered to be an essential property of effectivity functions [7, 12] . Thus, while the proof of Theorem 3.2 below makes use of the techniques applied in [7, 12] , it generalizes the results obtained previously.
We now introduce the combination of properties needed to characterize effectivity functions. Call an effectivity function (2) AE Ë ¾ ´ µ, (3) is AE-maximal, (4) is outcome-monotonic, and (5) is superadditive. It can be shown that these conditions are independent. LEMMA 3.1 Every playable effectivity function is regular and coalition-monotonic.
PROOF. For regularity, let ¾ ´ µ and assume by reductio that ¾ ´ µ. By superadditivity, ¾ ´AE µ, contradicting condition (1) of playability.
For coalition monotonicity, let ¾ ´ µ and
of playability give us Ë ¾ ´ ¼¼ µ and so by superadditivity, ¾ ´ ¼¼ µ ´ ¼ µ.
THEOREM 3.2 (Characterization)
An effectivity function is playable iff it is the effectivity function of some strategic game.
PROOF. One can easily check that the effectivity function of any strategic game satisfies the five properties mentioned. As for the other direction, let be an effectivity function satisfying the five properties. We shall construct a game such that . To simplify our definitions, assume that AE ½ Ò .
To guide the reader through the following technical proof, we first provide a more informal sketch of the main argument: given the playable effectivity function , we construct a strategic game Ǽ ¦ ¾ AE Ó Ë µ. A strategy for player will be a triple´ Ø µ:
for every coalition of which is a member, the function picks a set which can force, and for every non-empty set , the function picks an element of . Thus, if player ends up as a member of coalition , he will force ´ µ, and if the choice is up to him, he will pick the outcome ´ ´ µµ. Since all players will force certain sets as part of their strategy , we use the Ø s to determine which player will get the power to determine the outcome state. The outcome of the game will be determined by the outcome function Ó roughly as follows: given´ ½ Ò µ, AE is partitioned into coalitions (as big as possible) such that all members of a coalition chose to force the same set. The outcome set will then be the result of each coalition forcing their set, i.e. the intersection of all the sets forced. The player who chooses which state in this set will be realized is then determined by adding up (modulo Ò) all the indices chosen as Ø . The effectivity function of this game is just .
Formally, for ¾ AE, let AE ¾ be the set of coalitions of which is a member. Let ÈËµ ´ µ ¾ ´ µ , so consist of all functions which associate to every coalition in which participates a set of outcomes for which is effective. Note that since for all coalitions , Ë ¾ ´ µ, will be non-empty for every player . Given
AE and a coalition , let È´ µ be the coarsest partition
Then given , let
Since there are only finitely many players, this partitioning process will eventually stop at some state Ö where È Ö´ µ È Ö·½´ µ, and we let È ½´ µ È Ö´ µ ½ . Since for all Ð and ¾ Ð we have ´ Ð µ ´ Ð µ we will simply write ´ Ð µ for it. Now let 
Characterizing effectivity in dictatorships
Besides characterizing the effectivity functions of strategic games in general, we can also try to characterize the effectivity functions of particular subclasses of strategic games, in particular dictatorships, given their relevance for defining extensive games without simultaneous moves.
Call an effectivity function
È´AEµ È´È´Ëµµ individualistic iff it is playable and ´AE µ Ë ¾AE ´ µ. The condition ensures that everything which can be forced can be forced already by some individual. The following result shows that individualism is an extremely strong assumption: while it seems to say only that the whole is equal to the sum of its parts, it actually says that the whole is equal to one particular part.
THEOREM 3.3
An effectivity function is individualistic iff it is the effectivity function of a dictatorship.
PROOF. First, if is the effectivity function of a dictatorship with dictator , is easily seen to be individualistic. Second, assume is individualistic, and so there is a strategic game such that .
We can assume that has at least two distinct outcomes Ø ½ and Ø ¾ , for otherwise is trivially a dictatorship. Suppose by reductio that there are two individuals ¾ AE such that Ø ½ ¾ ´ µ and Ø ¾ ¾ ´ µ. Then by superadditivity, ¾ ´ µ, a contradiction. Hence, there is a player who can force any outcome, so is a dictatorship.
Put positively, unless we have a dictatorship, coalitions of agents can sometimes achieve more than their members individually, cooperation is thus advantageous.
Semi-playability and AE-maximality
In some of the definitions used in the completeness and complexity arguments to follow we will define effectivity functions with two separate clauses, one for all coalitions AE, and another one for AE. Since the objective is to obtain playable effectivity functions, the definition will make sure that ¾ ´AE µ iff ¾ ´ µ. Verifying that an effectivity function defined in such a way is playable is facilitated by the following lemma. It makes use of the notion of semi-playability, to be thought of as playability for all coalitions other than AE, excluding the condition of AE-maximality.
Call an effectivity function

È´AEµ
È´È´Ëµµ semi-playable iff (1)
AE Ë ¾ ´ µ, (3) is outcome-monotonic for all coalitions AE, and (4) An effectivity function is playable iff it is semi-playable, regular and AE-maximal. PROOF. All the playability conditions for AE follow almost immediately from the correspond- 
Syntax and semantics of coalition logic
Given a finite non-empty set of agents/players AE, we define the syntax of Coalition Logic as follows. Given a set of atomic propositions¨¼, a formula ³ can have the following syntactic form:
³ Ô ³ ³ ³ ³ where Ô ¾¨¼ and AE. We define , , and°as usual. In the case , we we write ³ instead of ³.
A coalition frame is a pair Ë µ where Ë is a non-empty set of states (the universe) and Ë ´È´AE µ ÈÈ´Ëµµµ is the playable effectivity structure of the model: for every state × ¾ Ë, ´×µ is a playable effectivity function. For easier readability, we shall often write × instead of ¾ ´×µ´ µ to denote that is effective for at state ×.
A coalition model is a pair Å ´ Î µ where is a coalition frame and Î 1 ÈËµ is the usual valuation function for the propositional letters.
From what was said in the preceding section, our restriction to playable effectivity functions should be clear: Theorem 3.2 guarantees that coalition frames are just game frames.
Since ´×µ is the effectivity function of a strategic game, every state × is associated with a strategic game ´×µ, and × holds iff coalition is effective for in ´×µ. Given such a model, truth of a formula in a model at a state is defined as follows Let Å be the class of all coalition models, and let Å be the class of coalition modelś´Ë µ Î µ where for all × ¾ Ë, ´×µ is individualistic. Given the characterization result for dictatorship from the previous section, we can thus think of Å as the class of dictatorial game models. Thanks to theorem 3.2, we are able to represent coalition models without referring to games and strategies. This simplifies the meta-theoretic treatment of our logic, and it also demonstrates that a coalition model is simply a multi-modal generalization of a neighbourhood model (or minimal model, see Section 7.2 and [4]), providing a neighbourhood relation for every coalition of players. Neighbourhood models have been the standard semantic tool to investigate non-normal modal logics, and techniques used to provide complete axiomatization for such logics can also be adapted to Coalition Logic.
Axiomatization
Given a set of players AE, a coalition logic for AE is a set of formulas £ which contains all propositional tautologies together with all instances of the axiom schemas listed in Figure 1 , and which is closed under the rules of Modus Ponens and Equivalence:
³ ³ ³° ³° Let Ä AE denote the smallest coalition logic for AE. Notice that the axioms are direct translations of the five playability conditions into the modal language, outcome monotonicity being captured by axiom Å. Ä AE is complete with respect to the class of all coalition models: ¦ Å ³ iff ¦ ÄAE ³.
Axiomatizing dictatorship
The logic Ä AE is the most general and hence weakest coalition logic. The only assumption made is that at every state, the coalitional power distribution arises from a situation which can be modelled as a strategic game. The stronger assumptions made for dictatorial frames also lead to an axiomatizable logic. Let Ä AE be the smallest coalition logic including the two
Let £ be any coalition logic extending Ä AE . We again consider the set of maximally £-consistent sets of formulas Ë £ . The crucial lemma needed for the completeness proof is that every × ¾ Ë £ has a local dictator.
LEMMA 5.6
For any × ¾ Ë £ , there is some ¾ AE such that for all formulas ³, if AE ³ ¾ × then ³ ¾ ×. PROOF. Suppose by reductio that there is some × ¾ Ë £ such that for every ¾ AE there is a formula ³ with AE ³ ¾ × and ³ ¾ ×. This implies that AE ½, and that there are two players ¾ AE and two formulas ³ and such that AE ³ AE ³ ¾ × (we have used axiom ½ ), while ³ ¾ ×. We also know that AE ³ ¾ ×, for otherwise AE ³ ¾ × and so by axiom AE, ³ ¾ × and using axiom Ë, ³ ¾ ×, a contradiction. But since AE ³ AE ¾ ×, axiom ¾ gives ³ ¾ ×, and hence ¾ ×, a contradiction.
As remarked earlier, the presence of a (local) dictator essentially turns coalition models into Kripke models. The completeness proof below should be seen as a translation of the completeness proof for a normal modal logic into the coalitional setup.
PROOF. For any coalition logic £ Ä AE , we construct the canonical model £ as before, except that for £ , we let
where × is the local dictator of × provided by the previous lemma. It can be verified that for all × ¾ Ë £ , ´×µ is individualistic. Furthermore, note that ´×µ is not only AE-maximal but maximal, and that for every with × ¾ , × £ implies × £ .
Next, one can establish the truth lemma for £ which makes use of the standard existence lemma: for all × ¾ Ë £ with ³ ¾ × and × ¾ , there is some Ü ¾ ³ such that for all AE ¾ Ü, AE ¾ ×. We construct this Ü by defining Ü ¼ ³ AE AE ¾ × . It can be shown that Ü ¼ is consistent, so one can construct a maximally consistent set Ü Ü ¼ which satisfies the conditions of the existence lemma. The proof continues as before.
Complexity
Upper bound
We will show that for a formula ³ of length Ò, there is a deterministic algorithm requiring space polynomial in Ò which computes whether or not ³ is satisfiable, i.e. whether or not ÄAE ³. The heart of the algorithm relies on Lemma 6.1 which reduces the satisfiability of ³ to the satisfiability of certain combinations of subformulas of ³ which have smaller modal depth. This method of providing a PSPACE-algorithm is adapted from [14] , where complexity results for various non-normal modal logics are proved. 
The following lemma provides the crucial link between satisfiability of a formula and satisfiability of its subformulas. Intuitively, the four conditions of the following lemma mirror the five playability requirements, where the last condition captures both superadditivity and monotonicity. To show that Å × ¼ ³, we show that for all ¾ Ð³µ, Î´ µ Â´ µ. The proof is by induction on , and base case and Boolean cases are immediate. For AE, let × ¾ Â´ µ. Depending on , this either means that Å × or that Ú´ µ ½ . In both cases, × Â´ µ holds and by induction hypothesis, × Î´ µ and hence × ¾ Î´ µ. Similarly for the converse direction, using claim 1 and 2.
For AE, condition 3 of the lemma is used. Suppose × ¾ Î´ AE µ, i.e. × ¾ Î´ µ, and hence by the previous argument × ¾ Â´ µ. In the case that × × ¼ , Å ×
, and AE-maximality gives × ¾ Â´ AE µ. In the case × × ¼ , Ú´ µ ¼. Now if we assume by reductio that Ú´ AE µ ¼ , condition 3 of the lemma would make satisfiable, a contradiction, and so Ú´ AE µ ½ , establishing × ¼ ¾ Â´ AE µ. The other direction makes use of condition 1. THEOREM 6.2 The satisfiability problem for Coalition Logic is in PSPACE.
PROOF. Consider the following description of the satisfiability game for formula ³: Assuming that a player who cannot choose as instructed loses (e.g. -player loses in step 2 if there is no semi-valuation for ³), we have defined a 2-player game. By Lemma 6.1, -player has a winning strategy in this game iff ³ is satisfiable. To analyse the time it takes to play the game, i.e. the maximal length of a play, let Ò be the length of formula ³, or equivalently Ò × ´³µ . For the purposes of this algorithm, we allow for generalized × ´Î µ × ´³µ Ò. Note that this recursive call reduces the modal depth of the formula by 1 until eventually ³ contains no more modalities, hence the number of recursive calls is at most Ò.
Thus, at most Ò rounds of Sat are played, each round taking time polynomial in Ò. Since the size of each game configuration is also polynomial in Ò, doing backward induction on the game tree can be done in PSPACE by a depth-first search algorithm. In other words, since Sat(³) contains a high-level description of an Alternating Turing Machine [3] there is an alternating polynomial time algorithm for satisfiability checking, and given that APTIME = PSPACE, this means that there is a deterministic polynomial space algorithm for satisfiability.
Lower bound
To show that the satisfiability problem for Coalition Logic is also PSPACE-hard, we show that the normal modal logic Ã is a sublogic of Coalition Logic, and hence its satisfiability problem (which is PSPACE-hard) can be reduced to satisfiability in Coalition Logic.
Consider the one-player coalition logic Ä ½ . Denoting ³ as ¾³ and ½ ³ as ¿³, Ä ½ is the smallest set of formulas containing all propositional tautologies and closed under Modus Ponens and Equivalence rule which contains the axioms of Figure 2 . PROOF. First, it can easily be shown that Ã Ä ½ by induction on the length of a derivation. Second, if AE is any non-empty set of players, for every formula ³ of Ä ½ , ³ ¾ Ä ½ iff ³ AE ¾ Ä AE , where ³ AE is the same as ³ except that coalition AE is substituted for coalition ½ . Inspecting the axioms, one sees that ³ ¾ Ä ½ implies that ³ AE ¾ Ä AE . For the other direction, if ³ ¾ Ä ½ , there is a coalition model Å ½ satisfying ³. It suffices to observe that Å ½ can easily be turned into a coalition model Å AE for the set of players AE which satisfies ³ AE .
As a result, there is a polynomial time translation from ³ into a formula ³ AE such that ³ is valid in Ã iff ³ AE is valid in Coalition Logic, where the length of ³ AE is polynomial in the length of ³. Hence the satisfiability problem of Ã is polynomial time reducible to the satisfiability problem of Coalition Logic. Since Ã Ã Ë , by Ladner's theorem [6] , the satisfiability problem for Ã is PSPACE-hard, and by the reduction, the satisfiability problem of Coalition Logic is PSPACE-hard as well.
The complexity of coalition formation
When investigating various non-normal epistemic logics in [14] , the author observes a complexity difference which hinges on the presence of the formula Ã ³ Ã Ã´³ µ where Ã ³should be read as 'the agent knows that ³'. Among the various epistemic systems investigated, logics which do not contain this principles have their satisfiability problem in NP, whereas those containing have it in PSPACE. While in the latter case, no lower bound is proved, it is conjectured that this principle formalizes an agent's ability to epistemically combine facts, i.e. to reason about the world, and that it is this ability which causes the (conjectured) complexity increase.
Assuming that NP PSPACE, an analogue of this conjecture can be proved for Coalition
Logic. As can be seen from the form that the superadditivity axiom Ë takes in Ä ½ (Figure 2) , superadditivity is the game-theoretic analogue of the epistemic principle . Instead of expressing the ability of an agent to combine facts, it expresses the ability of agents to combine their strategies when forming a coalition. And in the case of Coalition Logic, it is possible to locate a complexity increase precisely in this ability to combine strategies, since one can show that for Coalition Logic without superadditivity, the satisfiability problem is NP-complete.
Without going into much detail, let Ä AE be Coalition Logic without the superadditivity axiom Ë, and assume that coalition models consist of effectivity functions which may or may not be superadditive. Since propositional logic is a part of Ä AE , the satisfiability problem of Ä AE is NP-hard. For a non-deterministic polynomial time algorithm solving the satisfiability problem, we again make use of a modified version of Lemma 6.1, where condition (1) If the set of players is a singleton such as ½ , coalition models correspond to game frames which are processes. Since every state is associated with a game in which an output state can be chosen, these coalition models are serial Kripke frames Å ´´Ë Êµ Î µ where Ê Ë ¢ Ë is the accessibility relation linking states to output/successor states and truth of a modal formula is defined by
Intuitively, non-serial Kripke frames equally well correspond to processes, the question arises however how coalitional power should be defined at states where no game can be played. It would seem natural to postulate that at these gameless states, no coalition can force anything, so ³ would be false at such states independent of and ³. While this approach is intuitively appealing, it destroys the Ä ½ Ã equality since at gameless states, ¾³ would be true (in normal modal logic) while ³ would be false (in Coalition Logic).
Two-player games: non-normal modal logic
Certain non-normal modal logics also emerge as special cases of Coalition Logic. Nonnormal modal logics [4] describe neighbourhood models Å Ë AEµ Î µ which are almost like coalition models except that they contain only a single effectivity function, i.e. AE Ë È´È´Ëµµ. ¾³ will be true at × if there is a neighbourhood of × such that every state in that neighbourhood makes ³ true: 
³ ³
The axiom expresses that for every set of states , either coalition is effective for or coalition is effective for .
The following theorem shows that the logic Å is nothing but deterministic 2-player Coalition Logic restricted to formulas talking about singleton coalitions. 
Ò-player games: Coalition Logic
Moving from 2 to Ò players we move from non-normal modal logic to general Coalition Logic. One special case that has been discussed for Ò-player games was the class of dictatorial frames, i.e. extensive games without simultaneous moves, with its associated Coalition Logic Ä AE . Figure 5 presents an overview of the systems discussed so far, where AE Ò. While we have come a long way from normal modal logic, note that possibility and necessity are still a part of general Coalition Logic: Game-theoretically, the possibility of ³ is the existence of an outcome where ³ holds and is thus expressed by AE ³, whereas the necessity of ³ corresponds to ³ holding at every outcome of the game, ³. Hence, possibility and necessity form extreme cases of coalitional power.
Extensions and applications
The aim of the present work has been largely foundational. The scope of modal logic has been extended to cover reasoning about coalitional effectivity in extensive games with simultaneous actions. The effectivity modality itself turns out to be an interesting hybrid between possibility and necessity. In the process, a result from social choice theory (Theorem 3.2) played a central role in obtaining a complete axiomatization. On the other hand, the perspective of modal logic led to a new dynamic view of effectivity (coalition frames) which in turn produced a generalization of the original characterization results obtained in [7, 12] . The present paper has already investigated two instances of additional axioms which lay down the relationship between what a group and what its members can force, namely weak and strong dictatorship. As has been shown in Section 3.2, even such very simple principles may have surprising consequences. Nonetheless, the present logic allows for investigating the consequences of less trivial relationships between group and group-member effectivity, e.g. democratic effectivity, where AE Ô Ô holds provided ½ ¾ AE .
A further extension of the present work is the addition of a modality for expressing global rather than local effectivity. While ³ refers to 's immediate effectiveness in bringing about ³, one may also want to reason about what the coalition can bring about in the extensive game as a whole, i.e. what terminal positions can be forced. This requires adding an iterated modality £ ³ in the style of dynamic logic [5] , and such an extension would allow for investigating the interplay between local and global coalitional principles. The result would be a step towards a coalitional multi-player version of Parikh's game logic.
Finally, the present approach ignores players' preferences altogether. The logic only provides means for reasoning about what coalitions can bring about, not what they will bring about. Especially when one also adds a belief or knowledge structure to the models, adding preferences and solution concepts could lead to a logic of coalition formation, formalizing some of the processes described in [13] .
